This is a hands-on lab. You have compromised credentials for svc-replication — an account that, through a misconfiguration, holds domain replication rights. Your goal: extract the domain's password hashes, including the all-important krbtgt account. Type the commands in the terminal below. The lab guides you step by step.
⚠ This is a fully simulated environment running in your browser. No real systems are involved. The commands and output mirror a real engagement against an authorised lab domain. Using these techniques on systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal.
You extracted every credential in the domain, including the krbtgt hash — which is enough to forge a Golden Ticket and own the domain indefinitely. This is why DCSync is treated as a full-domain-compromise event.
Now read how defenders catch exactly what you just did: DCSync: Detection & Defense →
DCSync abuses the MS-DRSR (Directory Replication Service Remote) protocol — the same mechanism Domain Controllers use to replicate directory data to each other. Instead of attacking a DC directly, the attack impersonates a DC and asks a real one to replicate account secrets. Because it uses a legitimate protocol and runs no code on the DC, it is far stealthier than dumping the NTDS.dit database directly.
The svc-replication account should never have held the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights. Those rights are meant only for Domain Controllers and Domain/Enterprise Admins. A delegation misconfiguration gave an ordinary service account a direct path to every credential in the domain.
Understanding the attack is how you stop it:
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All. Remove it from anything that isn't a DC or a tiered admin.Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK: T1003.006 — OS Credential Dumping: DCSync.